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Abstract
Belief-importance (belimp) theory hypothesizes that personality traits confer a propensity to
perceive convergences or divergences between the belief that we can attain certain goals
and the importance that we place on these goals. Belief and importance are conceptualized
as two coordinates, together defining the belimp plane. We tested fundamental aspects of
the theory using four different planes based on the life domains of appearance, family, finan-
cial security, and friendship as well as a global plane combining these four domains. The cri-
teria were from the areas of personality (Big Five and trait emotional intelligence) and
learning styles. Two hundred and fifty eight participants were allocated into the four quad-
rants of the belimp plane (Hubris, Motivation, Depression, and Apathy) according to their
scores on four reliable instruments. Most hypotheses were supported by the data. Results
are discussed with reference to the stability of the belimp classifications under different life
domains and the relationship of the quadrants with the personality traits that are hypothe-
sized to underpin them.
Introduction
Belief-importance theory (abbreviated to ‘belimp’ in order to conserve space and facilitate the
nomenclature) posits that certain personality traits confer on the individual a propensity to
perceive convergences and divergences between their belief that they can attain goals and the
importance that they place on these goals [1–4]. Belief and importance are conceptualized as
two coordinates, together defining the belimp plane (see Fig 1). Although they are depicted as
orthogonal, in practice, the two coordinates will generally be correlated because people tend to
invest in goals that they value more.
Aspects of, mainly, conscientiousness and introversion confer a tendency to move towards
the belimp axis of symmetry (see Fig 1), while aspects of, mainly, neuroticism and trait emo-
tional intelligence (trait EI) confer a tendency to move away from the axis. Divergence from
the axis creates discrepancies (residuals) that can be either positive (belief > importance) or
negative (belief < importance). It is hypothesized that personality traits determine both the in-
dividual’s location along the axis of symmetry (high versus low) as well as the direction of the
discrepancies (positive versus negative).
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0121978 April 13, 2015 1/1 4
OPEN ACCESS
Citation: Petrides KV, Furnham A (2015) Further
Tests of Belief-Importance Theory. PLoS ONE 10(4):
e0121978. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0121978
Academic Editor: Alessio Avenanti, University of
Bologna, ITALY
Received: October 29, 2014
Accepted: February 9, 2015
Published: April 13, 2015
Copyright: © 2015 Petrides, Furnham. This is an
open access article distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author and source are
credited.
Data Availability Statement: All relevant data are
within the paper and its Supporting Information files.
Funding: The authors have no support or funding to
report.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared
that no competing interests exist.The two belimp coordinates (viz., belief and importance) are individually and jointly ex-
posed to the effects of personality traits. Despite pronounced differences in value hierarchies,
the theory posits that certain traits (e.g., aspects of conscientiousness) predispose people to-
wards taking life more seriously and, thus, towards placing fairly high importance on multiple
life domains (attractiveness, family, security, work, etc.). Life domains can be construed as in-
telligible regions of life experience [5]. The precise meaning, nature, and role of life domains in
the context of belimp theory are discussed in Petrides [2]. Contrary to the view that confidence
is essentially task-dependent [6], we believe that certain personality traits (especially aspects of
trait EI) predispose people towards being generally confident.
Four quadrants are conceptualized within the belimp plane and, for heuristic purposes, la-
beled in terms of affect and motivation (see Fig 1). Clockwise from top left, we have the quad-
rants of Hubris, Motivation, Depression, and Apathy, loosely corresponding to the personality
dimensions of trait EI, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and introversion. The labels are heuris-
tic and intend to highlight connections between belimp processes and broad dimensions of
personality. These connections relate primarily to specific facets of the dimensions, and not
necessarily to their global scores, which often represent an amalgamation of rather disparate
constructs [7].
Two different types of belimp plane can be identified: the conditional belimp plane, of
which there are many, and the master belimp plane, of which there is only one. The former are
planes specified in relation to a particular life domain (e.g., family or finance) and, therefore,
conditional upon it. The latter is a hypothetical plane arising from averaging conditional planes
over multiple life domains. An individual’s position in the master belimp plane represents their
typical belimp position. Conditional belimp planes can be either concordant or discordant in
Fig 1. The Belief-Importance (Belimp) Plane. The figure presents the four belimp quadrants (Hubris,
Motivation, Depression, and Apathy), along with the personality dimensions and specific personality facets
that may underpin them. Because dimensions and facets will often cut across quadrants, we present, for
each quadrant, a discriminating trait that helps distinguish it from adjacent quadrants (see [1] for empirical
results). The axis of symmetry (diagonal line) and the inner and outer belimp plane regions (shaded and
unshaded, respectively) are also depicted in the figure (see [2] for an explanation and discussion).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0121978.g001
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gree of concordance between a conditional plane and the master plane is an empirical question
(largely depending on the individual’s value hierarchy).
Because personality dimensions encompass quite heterogeneous concepts (for example, Ex-
traversion combines sociability, activity, and impulsivity), no single personality dimension can
be conceived of as the preserve of any one belimp quadrant. We may not presume that scores
on, say, introversion-related variables will be statistically significantly higher in the Apathy
quadrant than in the other three quadrants in every conditional plane, since aspects of intro-
version may well be implicated in all four quadrants. Nevertheless, we would expect that, over
a number of randomly drawn life domains, pooled introversion scores in the Apathy quadrant
will be at least numerically higher than in the other quadrants.
Central in belimp theory is the hypothesis that a person’s position in a conditional plane
will be a function of their personality, the life domain under consideration, and other, undeter-
mined, factors of more minor influence. Averaging over multiple conditional planes will cause
all effects gradually to cancel out, except those of the dominant personality traits that are ex-
pected to act as principal determinants of the individual’s typical position in the master plane
(from which positions in conditional planes will deviate to various extents).
Significance of belimp theory and links with related theories
The significance of belimp theory lies in its potential to provide an explanatory mechanism for
the effects of personality traits. One of the sharpest criticisms levelled against personality trait
theory is that its explanations are often aetiologically weak or tautological [6]; [8]; [9]. In other
words, there are hardly any mechanisms (e.g., in the sociocognitive sense) describing how per-
sonality traits come to affect real-life behaviors. Belimp theory offers such a mechanism based
on convergences and divergences between how confident we are that we can achieve goals and
how important these goals are to us.
For example, we propose that one specific process through which the personality dimension
of neuroticism generates negative affect and, potentially, depression is through its tendency to
produce discrepancies between the importance an individual attaches to certain goals and her
confidence that she can achieve those goals. To be sure, these discrepancies will vary in their
extent and manner of manifestation across different areas of life (life domains), but the neurot-
ic person will be characterized by a generalized tendency to perceive discrepancies, rather than
convergences, in their life. There are other noteworthy advantages of belimp theory, such as
the efficiencies and improvements it affords in relation to criterion prediction, but these are
outside the scope of the present paper and discussed elsewhere (e.g., [4]).
Belimp theory may be seen as a generalization of a class of theories known as expectancy—
value (EV) theories (e.g., [10]; [11]). While the belief and importance coordinates could be
roughly aligned to the concepts of expectancy and value, respectively, they are certainly not in-
terchangeable with them. A description of the similarities and differences between belimp theo-
ry and EV theories is presented in Petrides [2].
Belimp theory, especially its belief coordinate, also intersects with Bandura’s[ 6] self-efficacy
theory. Self-efficacy differs from the belimp coordinate of belief in that it is task-specific, rather
than general, and concerns confidence in performing particular actions, rather than confidence
in achieving broad goals. As previously noted, we believe that certain personality traits (e.g., as-
pects of trait EI) predispose people towards being generally confident that they can achieve, irre-
spective of the goals they are pursuing (although the confidence level will obviously vary from
goal to goal). This means that, in general, individuals who are high on certain aspects of trait EI
will be more likely to agree with statements starting “I really believe I can ...”, irrespective of
Belimp Theory
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at school”). Thus, while self-efficacy is fully contextualized, the belief dimension in belimp
theory is only partially contextualized in conditional planes and fully decontextualized in the
master plane.
Results of previous tests of belimp theory
A number of belimp studies have been conducted so far, the results of which are briefly sum-
marized below. Petrides [1] tested 12 hypotheses based on a conditional belimp plane of attrac-
tiveness with reference to the Big Five and trait EI, and found support for ten of them. Petrides
([3]; Study 1) tested seven hypotheses based on a conditional belimp plane of financial security
with reference to trait EI, mood, and somatic complaints, and found support for six of them,
while in Study 2 he tested a total of nine hypotheses based on two conditional belimp planes
(appearance and popularity) with reference to trait EI and also found support for six of them.
Petrides and Frederickson [4] tested eight hypotheses based on a conditional belimp plane
of academic achievement with reference to Eysenckian personality [12], trait EI, and academic
performance in national examinations, and found support for six of them. A set of hierarchical
regressions in the same paper showed that the belimp co-ordinates (especially the coordinate
of belief) were stronger predictors of academic performance than the Giant Three [12]
personality dimensions.
The present study
The present study seeks to replicate and extend the findings summarized above. Its major con-
tribution is that it utilizes the largest number of conditional belimp planes so far (four: appear-
ance, financial security, family, and friends). This will allow a direct investigation of the extent
to which seemingly unrelated conditional planes produce convergent belimp classifications, as
posited by the theory.
In addition, it will be possible to test the same hypotheses through different conditional
belimp planes. The results of these tests are crucial for belimp theory because they must remain
relatively invariant across the different conditional planes. In other words, the hypotheses ad-
vanced to test belimp theory are based solely on the individual’s location on the master belimp
plane and do not get adjusted as a function of the life domain.
The study focuses on the following dependent variables: Big Five, trait EI, and learning
approaches. With respect to the Big Five, we used the NEO-FFI, from which we derived item-
cluster scores in addition to dimensional scores, as proposed by Saucier [13]. The Big Five
personality dimensions are thought by some to provide a comprehensive operationalization
of individual differences in human personality. They comprise Neuroticism (e.g., anxiety,
moodiness, and vulnerability), Extraversion (e.g., activity, assertiveness, and talkativeness),
Openness-to-Experience (e.g., curiosity, imagination, and originality), Agreeableness (e.g., co-
operation, friendliness, and trust), and Conscientiousness (e.g., dependability, orderliness, and
reliability). A detailed description of the Big Five model of personality can be found in McCrae
and Costa [14].
Trait EI is defined as a constellation of emotional perceptions located at the lower levels of
personality hierarchies [15]. Essentially, the construct concerns people’s perceptions of their
emotional abilities. The global trait EI score provides a snapshot of one’s general emotional
functioning. Among a host of other variables, it correlates positively with narcissism [16],
which renders it relevant to the Hubris quadrant in the belimp plane (see Fig 1).
Learning approaches collectively refer to why learners learn (learning motives) as well as to
how they like to learn (learning strategies). These motives and strategies give rise to broader
Belimp Theory
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such approaches have been identified and studied in the literature: the surface approach (seek-
ing to satisfy minimum requirements), the deep approach (seeking to understand what is
learnt), and the achieving approach (seeking to maximize self-esteem through learning).
In accordance with belimp theory as outlined above, the following hypotheses were
advanced:
H1a: The Hubris quadrant will have the highest score on trait EI
H1b: The Hubris quadrant will have the highest score on positive affect
H2a: The Motivation quadrant will have the highest score on conscientiousness
H2b: The Motivation quadrant will have the highest score on goal-striving
H2c: The Motivation quadrant will have the highest score on orderliness
H3a: The Depression quadrant will have the highest score on neuroticism
H3b: The Depression quadrant will have the highest score on negative affect
H3c: The Depression quadrant will have the highest score on self-reproach
H4a: The Apathy quadrant will have the lowest score on extraversion
H4b: The Apathy quadrant will have the lowest score on activity
H4c: The Apathy quadrant will have the lowest score on sociability
H4d: The Apathy quadrant will have the lowest score on the deep learning approach
H4e: The Apathy quadrant will have the lowest score on the achievement learning approach
H5: There will be a statistically significant overlap between the classifications derived from
the four different life domains (appearance, family, finance, and friends).
It should be noted that these hypotheses do not imply that the target quadrant (e.g., Hubris
in H1a) will score statistically significantly higher than all three other quadrants. Rather, the ex-
pectation is that the target quadrant will more likely have a numerically higher (or lower) score
than the other three quadrants, if a hypothesis is fully supported, and a numerically higher (or
lower) score than at least two other quadrants, if a hypothesis is partially supported. That is not
to say, of course, that numerous statistically significant differences may not emerge anyway, es-
pecially in research designs with larger sample sizes (for a brief discussion of the role of sample
size in belimp theory, see ‘Data analysis’ in the Method section).
Method
Participants
Two hundred and fifty eight individuals (mainly undergraduate psychology students at British
universities) participated in the study. Demographic data were available for 190 (134 female
and 56 male) participants, whose mean age was 19.68 years (SD = 2.43 years; range 18–42
years). Due to experimenter error, demographic data were missing from 68 participants in our
sample and it is only possible to provide a general description of their characteristics. Thirty
nine of the missing cases were undergraduate psychology students at a British university and
would have had very similar characteristics to those reported above. The remaining 29 were
post-graduate students in a business school and would have been somewhat older and roughly
equally split on gender.
Measures
Belimp instrument. Four life domains were assessed via standard belimp instruments (see
S1 Questionnaires). The first instrument comprised five questions concerning the belief that
certain appearance-related goals can be attained (“I really believe I can be good-looking”) and
five matching questions concerning the importance placed on those goals (“It is important to
me to be good-looking”). The alphas for the two scales were, respectively, .95 and .91.
Belimp Theory
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related goals can be attained (“I really believe I can have a good relationship with my family”)
and five matching questions concerning the importance placed on those goals (“It is important
to me to have a good relationship with my family”). The alphas for the two scales were, respec-
tively, .84 and .87.
The third instrument comprised five questions concerning the belief that certain finance-
related goals can be attained (“I really believe I can be financially secure”) and five matching
questions concerning the importance placed on those goals (“It is important to me to be finan-
cially secure”). The alphas for the two scales were, respectively, .86 and .75.
The fourth and last instrument comprised five questions concerning the belief that certain
friends-related goals can be attained (“I really believe I can have a good relationship with my
friends”) and five matching questions concerning the importance placed on those goals (“It is
important to me to have a good relationship with my friends”). The alphas for the two scales
were, respectively, .87 and .85.
Neuroticism Extraversion Openness—Five Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI; [19]). The
NEO-FFI is a shortened version of the NEO Personality Inventory- Revised. It comprises 60
items, 12 for each of the five dimensions of adult personality: Neuroticism, Extraversion, Open-
ness to Experience, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness. The internal consistencies of the
five factors were .83 for Neuroticism, .71 for Extraversion, .70 for Openness, .77 for Agreeable-
ness, and .71 for Conscientiousness. In addition to scores on the five higher-order factors, we
also derived item-cluster scores following the procedures outlined in Saucier [13]. The follow-
ing clusters were used (internal consistencies are given in parentheses, followed by the initial
of the Big Five dimension to which the cluster belongs): positive affect (.48—E), goal-striving
(.71—C), orderliness (.43—C), negative affect (.65—N), self-reproach (.83—N), activity
(.60—E), and sociability (.57—E).
Study Process Questionnaire (SPQ; [17]). The 42-item version of the SPQ was used to
measure approaches to learning (surface, deep, and achieving). Items were responded to on a
5-point Likert scale. On this sample, the internal consistencies were .74, .65, and .73, respective-
ly, for the surface, deep, and achieving learning approaches.
Trait Emotional Intelligence Questionnaire—Short Form (TEIQue-SF; [20]). This is a
30-item questionnaire designed to measure global trait EI. Two items from each of the 15 facets
of the full form of the TEIQue were selected for inclusion, based primarily on their correlations
with the corresponding total facet scores. A detailed description of the psychometric properties
of the TEIQue-SF can be found in Cooper and Petrides [21]. The current study focuses on the
global trait EI score, whose internal consistency was .85 on this sample.
Procedure
Participants were given a battery of paper-and-pencil questionnaires, which they completed in
class or in their own time. After the information was collected, data were anonymized through a
coding system. Instructions were presented directly on the questionnaires and participation was
voluntary. Informed consent was incorporated into thequestionnaire. The study received ethical
clearance by the ethics committee at the UCL Division of Psychology and Language Sciences.
Data analysis
There are several different strategies for testing belimp theory, which Petrides [2] describes in
some detail. In this paper, we will rely on one-way ANOVAs followed by post-hoc tests because
of their simplicity and comparatively lower sample size requirements. Four groups will be
formed based on 2x2 classification tables combining high and low scores on the two coordinates
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family, finance, and friends). In addition, a global classification will be produced by combining
ratings on the four aforementioned life domains.
As regards statistical power, the effects of personality traits on classifying participants into
conditional belimp planes are expected to be small (not unlike the effects observed in molecular
genetic studies of personality; [22]). This is due to the fact that belimp classifications are influ-
enced by a multitude of other factors, especially by the life domain on which a conditional
plane is based. Belimp theory is asymptotic [2], therefore, samples sizes much larger than the
one employed herein will be required to obtain statistically significant results for every hypoth-
esis tested. Nevertheless, numerical differences are of interest when evaluating belimp theory,
particularly because they can be aggregated in the context of a meta-analysis.
In order to evaluate H5, viz., that there will be statistically significant overlap between the
four different belimp classifications based on the life domains of appearance, family, finance,
and friends, we will perform a series of chi-squared tests. With four different life domains, six
cross-classifications are possible and, therefore, six chi-squared tests will be performed. Cra-
mer’s V statistics, providing an indication of the strength of association between the variables,
will also be reported.
Results
Twelve one-way ANOVAs were performed per classification in order to test the bulk of the
study hypotheses. Statistical details for the ANOVAs, including cell sizes, descriptive statistics,
and Tukey post-hoc tests, are presented in Tables 1 to 5. The four groups in Fig 1 were derived
in four different ways (i.e., separately for each life domain) by combining mean-split (high ver-
sus low) scores on belief and importance (1: appearance, 2:family, 3:finance, and 4:friends). A
fifth classification (5: global) was derived from combined ratings on all four life domains. We










Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD F
Global trait EI 156.54 14.31 154.99 18.13 134.46 14.07 143.66 19.71 16.71* m> a, d; h> d
Positive affect 14.14 2.09 14.34 2.08 13.52 2.84 14.52 2.80 1.62 -
Conscientiousness 42.06 8.27 43.95 6.41 43.24 4.89 44.10 5.45 .96 -
Goal-striving 11.08 2.35 11.94 1.91 11.84 1.84 11.38 2.03 2.26 -
Orderliness 16.67 3.76 16.89 3.12 16.60 2.39 17.00 2.86 2.05 -
Neuroticism 31.70 8.58 32.77 8.35 43.10 6.24 36.63 8.17 18.65* a> h, m; d> a, h, m
Negative affect 15.21 3.85 15.28 3.56 17.67 4.06 15.99 3.49 4.68* d>h, m
Self-reproach 16.29 5.24 17.54 5.00 24.10 4.11 19.93 5.29 21.49* a> h, m; d> a, h, m
Extraversion 41.71 5.90 44.59 4.87 40.18 6.86 41.60 6.07 7.03* m> d
Activity 13.91 2.82 14.64 2.17 13.26 2.45 13.43 2.64 4.81* m> d
Sociability 13.80 2.39 14.47 2.24 13.60 2.91 13.08 2.62 4.62* m> a
SDQ deep learning 47.00 6.57 48.23 8.89 45.39 6.84 46.19 7.82 1.54 -
SDQ achievement learning 45.09 8.68 47.98 6.21 47.03 6.10 46.35 7.90 1.55 -
Note. Degrees of freedom for all ANOVA numerators were 3 and for denominators ranged between 232–252, depending on missing data. Cell sizes















Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD F
Global trait EI 148.91 18.87 152.87 17.34 141.66 19.51 144.59 20.46 4.61* m> a, d
Positive affect 14.81 2.38 14.03 2.12 14.11 3.03 14.47 2.70 .95 -
Conscientiousness 41.39 4.96 44.74 6.28 41.59 5.01 43.49 6.53 3.42* m> d
Goal-striving 10.65 1.47 11.93 2.07 11.42 1.55 11.57 2.19 2.93* m> h
Orderliness 15.58 2.76 17.30 3.08 15.92 2.39 16.93 3.10 3.33* -
Neuroticism 33.91 6.93 34.11 8.45 38.89 9.13 36.47 9.32 3.38* d> m
Negative affect 15.36 2.97 15.38 3.68 16.45 3.76 16.58 3.94 2.05 -
Self-reproach 18.83 5.04 18.29 5.17 21.21 6.22 19.81 5.74 3.14* d> m
Extraversion 41.55 5.37 43.05 5.53 41.97 6.18 42.38 6.70 .58 -
Activity 13.23 1.74 14.13 2.48 13.89 2.39 13.86 2.80 .84 -
Sociability 13.57 3.13 14.03 2.20 13.39 2.80 13.73 2.80 .73 -
SDQ deep learning 47.59 7.91 47.01 8.48 46.97 6.01 46.88 8.20 .05 -
SDQ achievement learning 43.71 6.17 47.76 7.01 47.00 8.20 46.55 6.89 2.01 -
Note. Degrees of freedom for all ANOVA numerators were 3 and for denominators ranged between 232–253, depending on missing data. Cell sizes














Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD F
Global trait EI 155.55 16.39 156.41 16.66 136.87 18.10 142.19 18.08 19.23* h> a, d; m> a, d
Positive affect 14.95 2.09 13.80 2.38 14.04 2.80 14.63 2.39 2.85* -
Conscientiousness 43.89 6.61 44.80 6.62 42.71 5.71 42.31 5.29 2.40 -
Goal-striving 11.88 1.87 12.01 2.05 11.29 1.97 11.22 2.00 2.81* -
Orderliness 17.21 3.58 17.04 3.13 16.61 2.79 16.51 2.57 .68 -
Neuroticism 31.39 6.74 33.18 8.81 39.61 8.32 38.03 8.36 12.17* a> h, m; d> h, m
Negative affect 15.10 3.72 15.40 3.49 17.94 15.69 15.69 3.62 4.93* d> h, m, a
Self-reproach 16.20 4.07 17.88 5.48 21.44 5.20 21.08 5.46 12.79* a> h, m; d> h, m
Extraversion 43.80 4.41 43.13 6.19 40.88 6.34 42.28 5.94 2.33 -
Activity 14.61 2.31 14.21 2.57 13.14 2.62 13.73 2.30 3.45* h> d
Sociability 13.95 2.28 14.00 2.47 13.59 2.80 13.62 2.67 .47 -
SDQ deep learning 48.87 7.63 49.00 8.76 44.33 7.49 45.12 6.10 6.22* h> d; m> d
SDQ achievement learning 45.68 9.54 48.69 6.95 45.96 6.33 45.95 5.80 2.99* -
Note. Degrees of freedom for all ANOVA numerators were 3 and for denominators ranged between 233–254, depending on missing data. Cell sizes















Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD F
Global trait EI 153.48 16.22 151.21 18.52 141.00 20.33 144.86 19.57 3.80* m> d
Positive affect 14.74 2.50 14.23 2.51 14.11 2.63 14.10 2.33 .54 -
Conscientiousness 44.50 6.19 43.96 5.84 41.56 5.90 43.39 6.74 1.27 -
Goal-striving 12.03 1.80 11.76 1.81 11.41 2.16 11.35 2.33 1.17 -
Orderliness 17.03 3.05 16.92 2.85 16.19 3.12 16.88 3.21 .47 -
Neuroticism 35.07 6.83 34.46 8.80 39.93 8.17 35.51 9.46 3.08* d> m
Negative affect 16.30 3.02 15.70 3.77 18.10 3.72 15.15 3.68 4.77* d> a, m
Self-reproach 18.58 5.27 18.54 5.21 21.83 5.21 19.50 6.14 2.00 d> m
Extraversion 44.07 5.19 43.16 5.95 41.52 6.47 41.30 6.13 2.35 -
Activity 14.06 2.48 13.88 2.33 14.31 3.00 13.77 2.65 .35 -
Sociability 13.81 2.14 14.20 2.32 13.79 2.81 13.14 2.91 2.67* m> a
SDQ deep learning 49.48 8.06 46.22 7.37 47.08 7.61 47.34 8.93 1.37 -
SDQ achievement learning 48.76 6.33 47.75 6.34 44.70 6.88 45.75 8.43 2.70* -
Note. Degrees of freedom for all ANOVA numerators were 3 and for denominators ranged between 233–254, depending on missing data. Cell sizes














Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD F
Global trait EI 159.45 13.07 156.16 15.85 135.45 13.07 140.55 17.57 25.17* h> a, d; m> a, d
Positive affect 14.40 2.44 14.27 2.12 13.21 2.85 14.79 2.53 2.05 a> d
Conscientiousness 43.90 7.76 44.33 6.39 42.36 6.30 43.28 5.96 1.12 -
Goal-striving 11.64 2.40 11.99 1.87 11.58 1.84 11.14 2.07 2.51 m>a
Orderliness 16.75 3.79 17.07 2.94 16.30 2.80 16.93 2.85 .71 -
Neuroticism 30.44 7.25 32.46 8.01 41.87 7.35 38.24 8.40 22.00* a> h, m; d> h, m
Negative affect 14.91 3.66 15.32 3.54 17.73 3.72 15.97 3.75 5.73* d> h, m
Self-reproach 15.34 4.49 17.46 4.68 22.87 5.19 21.24 5.34 23.78* a> h, m; d> h, m
Extraversion 43.48 5.69 44.23 5.08 39.84 6.49 41.46 6.15 7.05* h> d; m> a, d
Activity 14.53 2.56 14.33 2.28 13.62 2.54 13.25 2.66 3.53* m> a
Sociability 14.00 2.24 14.38 2.10 13.19 2.84 13.24 2.93 3.94* m > a, d
SDQ deep learning 48.91 7.25 48.13 8.78 45.67 7.73 45.20 6.90 2.94* -
SDQ achievement learning 47.26 8.44 48.24 6.49 46.82 6.44 44.82 7.40 3.32* m> a
Note. Degrees of freedom for all ANOVA numerators were 3 and for denominators ranged between 232–252, depending on missing data. Cell sizes
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sponding to the five classifications.
Appearance
Overall, six of the 13 hypotheses were supported fully, six partially, and one not at all (see
Table 1). The Hubris quadrant had the highest score on trait EI, but only the third highest on
positive affect, thus supporting H1a fully, but failing to support H1b. H2a and H2c were par-
tially supported, with Motivation scoring second-highest on conscientiousness and orderliness.
H2b received full support, with Motivation scoring highest on goal-striving. H3a—H3c were
also fully supported, with the Depression quadrant scoring highest on neuroticism, negative af-
fect, and self-reproach. Apathy had the second lowest score on extraversion, activity, and the
deep and achievement learning strategies, thus partially supporting H4a, H4b, H4d, and H4e.I t
scored lowest on sociability, thus fully supporting H4c.
Family
Overall, seven of the 13 hypotheses were supported fully, four partially, and two not at all (see
Table 2). The Hubris quadrant had the second-highest score on global trait EI and the highest
score on positive affect, thus providing partial support for H1a and full support for H1b. H2a
—H2c were fully supported, with Motivation scoring highest on conscientiousness, goal-
striving, and orderliness. H3a and H3c were also fully supported, with the Depression quadrant
scoring highest on neuroticism and self-reproach. It scored second-highest on negative affect,
thus partially supporting H2b. Apathy had the lowest score on the deep learning strategy, sec-
ond-lowest score on activity and the achievement learning strategy, and third-lowest score on
extraversion and sociability, thus fully supporting H4d, partially supporting H4b and H4e, and
failing to support H4a and H4c.
Finance
Overall, six of the 13 hypotheses were supported fully and seven partially (see Table 3). The
Hubris quadrant had the second-highest score on global trait EI and the highest score on posi-
tive affect, thus providing partial support for H1a and full support for H1b. The Motivation
quadrant had the highest score on conscientiousness and goal-striving, thus fully supporting
H2a and H2b, and the second highest score on orderliness, thus partially supporting H2c. The
Depression quadrant scored highest on neuroticism, negative affect, and self-reproach, thus
fully supporting H3a—H3c. Apathy had the second-lowest score on all relevant dependent var-
iables (viz., extraversion, activity, sociability, and the deep and achievement learning strate-
gies), thus partially supporting H4a—H4e.
Friends
Overall, eight of the 13 hypotheses were supported fully, four partially, and one not at all (see
Table 4). H1a and H1b were fully supported, with the Hubris quadrant scoring highest on glob-
al trait EI and positive affect. The Motivation quadrant had the second highest score on consci-
entiousness, goal-striving, and orderliness, thus partially supporting H2a—H2c. H3a—H3c
were fully supported, with the Depression quadrant scoring highest on neuroticism, negative
affect, and self-reproach. Apathy had the lowest score on extraversion, activity, sociability, the
second-lowest on the achievement learning strategy, and the third-lowest on the deep learning
strategy. These results provided full support for H4a—H4c, partial support for H4e, and no
support for H4d.
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The global classification was derived from combining ratings on the aforementioned four life
domains (see Table 5). Overall, ten of the 13 hypotheses were supported fully and three partial-
ly. The Hubris quadrant scored highest on trait EI and second-highest on positive affect, thus
supporting H1a fully and H1b partially. H2a—H2c were fully supported with the Motivation
quadrant scoring highest conscientiousness, goal-striving, and orderliness. H3a—H3c were
also fully supported with the Depression quadrant scoring highest on neuroticism, negative af-
fect, and self-reproach. Apathy had the lowest score on activity and the deep and achievement
learning styles, and the second-lowest on extraversion and sociability. These results fully sup-
ported H4b, H4d, and H4e and partially supported H4a and H4c.
Classification overlaps
The last hypothesis to be tested was H5, viz., that there will be statistically significant overlap
between the four belimp classifications, which we assessed through six chi-squared tests.
Statistically significant associations were found between the appearance and family classifi-
cations (χ
2
(9) = 18.05, p<.05; Cramer’s V = .153), the appearance and finance classifications
(χ
2
(9) = 72.44, p<.01; Cramer’s V = .530), the family and friends classifications (χ
2
(9) = 38.74,
p<.01; Cramer’s V = .223), the family and finance classifications (χ
2
(9) = 22.82, p<.01; Cra-
mer’s V = .171), and the finance and friends classification (χ
2
(9) = 23.62, p<.01; Cramer’s
V = .74). The only classifications that did not overlap significantly were appearance and friends
(χ
2
(9) = 8.00, p>.05; Cramer’s V = .102). Overall, these results provide strong support for H5.
Discussion
This study employed the largest number of conditional belimp planes in the literature so far.
Consequently, it allowed for the most rigorous investigation of central aspects of the theory,
particularly those relating to the stability of belimp classifications.
Stability of belimp classifications
Stability was directly assessed through a series of chi-squared tests designed to evaluate H5,
viz., that the different belimp classifications will overlap. With four different life domains, six
cross-classifications were possible, five of which showed statistically significant overlap.
For example, the classification of respondents into the four belimp quadrants (Hubris, Mo-
tivation, Depression, and Apathy) according to their ratings on the life domain of appearance
overlapped significantly with their classification according to the life domain of finance. In
other words, participants were fairly consistently classified into the same quadrants, irrespec-
tive of whether the allocation was based on appearance- or finance-related goals. And so for
the classification pairs of family and friends, family and finance, and finance and friends. The
only apparently independent classifications were appearance and friends.
These findings confirm and extend Petrides [3], wherein a strong overlap was recorded be-
tween two belimp classifications based on appearance and popularity. Our results go consider-
ably beyond Petrides [3], however, not only in terms of the larger number of life domains
involved, but also in terms of the spectrum of variation in the conceptual overlap of those do-
mains. Thus, although it could be argued that the statistical overlap in Petrides [3] was partially
a function of conceptually cognate life domains (appearance and popularity), this limitation was
eliminated from our research design by simultaneously incorporating life domains that are not
simply conceptually unrelated, but indeed potentially adversative (e.g., friends and finance).
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search design, overlap of the various cross-classifications, we may proceed to examine some of
the underlying factors responsible for this overlap. Why is it that cross-classifications based on
qualitatively different life domains should show any overlap at all? For such overlap to be docu-
mented, it is logically necessary that causal influencesbe in operation. Belimp theory [2] suggests
that such influences are exerted by various underlying personality traits as described below.
Personality traits and belimp quadrants
At the heart of belimp theory lies the premise that certain personality traits confer a predisposi-
tion to perceive convergences/discrepancies between an individual’s belief they can attain
certain goals and the importance they place on these goals. These predispositions operate irre-
spective of the nature of the goals, although they may obviously be moderated by a host of
other factors, such as interests, values, and personal circumstances. Fig 1 is an attempt to label
those convergences/discrepancies and map them onto four broad personality traits.
How well do the results of this study support the mapping in Fig 1? Of a total of 52 different
hypotheses based on four different life domains (13 hypotheses per domain), 27 were fully sup-
ported, 21 partially supported, and only four were not supported at all. When the ratings from
the four life domains were combined into a global classification in order to attenuate the influ-
ences of extraneous factors, ten hypotheses were fully supported and three partially.
We believe that these results lend solid support to belimp theory, especially in light of the
fact that most dependent variables had modest-to-low internal consistencies. Low alphas intro-
duce error in the statistical analysis and attenuate the effects of independent variables. There-
fore, we are confident that even more favorable results may be obtained with measures that are
highly reliable.
Of the 25 hypotheses that were not fully supported, 15 (60%) involved the quadrant of Apa-
thy. The Apathy quadrant is hypothesized to relate specifically to the trait of inactivity-activity,
but, more generally, to the personality dimension of Introversion-Extraversion. From the pres-
ent results, the trait of inactivity-activity does not seem to be a sufficiently strong marker to
support hypotheses extrapolated to the entire dimension of Introversion-Extraversion. This
may be especially true in operationalizations that under-emphasize the activity component of
Extraversion, such as the Eysenckian (see, e.g., the testing of Hypothesis H4 in [4]).
A conceptual adjustment may also be required in relation to the Hubris quadrant, which is
perhaps more closely related to narcissism than to trait emotional intelligence. As a key charac-
teristic, the Hubris quadrant entails a conviction that one can attain even those goals that are
unimportant to her, a fairly common belief among narcissists [23]. It is mainly the narcissistic
aspect of trait EI (see [16]) that renders it a suitable candidate for underpinning the Hubris
quadrant. Greater precision, and results that are even more promising, may be obtained by nar-
rowing down some of the personality dimensions in belimp theory to primary personality traits
(‘facets’). Such adjustments would be consistent with empirical findings showing that facets are
often better predictors of behavioral outcomes than broad-bandwidth personality dimensions
(e.g., [24]; [25]).
From the perspective of individual life-domains, appearance and finance yielded the fewest
full confirmations of hypotheses (46%), while friends yielded the most (62%). Importantly, as
far as the belimp principle of aggregation is concerned, the highest confirmation rate, overall,
was achieved through the global classification (which pulled data from all four life domains),
wherein 77% of hypotheses were fully supported. In line with belimp theory, this result clearly
suggests that as data are pooled over multiple life domains, the relationship between the belimp
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introduction).
Limitations
The student sample may have led to restriction of range effects due to the relative homogeneity
of backgrounds and experiences. Restriction of range would have had a negative impact on the
observed effects. Another shortcoming concerns the relatively low internal consistencies of
many dependent variables that introduced error in the analyses, making it more difficult to
find support for the study’s hypotheses. Last, the exclusive use of self-report questionnaires
often undermines the differentiation between certain quadrants (especially between Motivation
and Hubris). These quadrants may be more easily distinguishable with objective data (e.g., aca-
demic performance scores; see [4]).
Conclusion
Belimp theory offers a general mechanism for linking personality traits to affect, motivation,
and action. Setting aside its advantages in criterion prediction (e.g., [4]), a crucial benefit is that
it describes a process through which the effects of personality traits are manifested in the
world. This is theoretically valuable because it goes some way towards addressing the over-
whelming explanatory deficits in personality trait theories [26].
Further possibilities present themselves in relation to personality interventions and behavior
modification programs. Such interventions could explicitly target the belimp mechanism with
a view to moderating the effects of the underlying traits without having to pursue the far more
ambitious project of changing one’s standing on the traits themselves [27].
Overall, the results of the present study substantially reinforce previous findings, derived
from related, but generally more limited, designs. Future research may continue to test and rep-
licate core aspects of belimp theory, with particular emphasis on criterion prediction. In due
course, this work may be able to provide a firm basis for the development of personality-driven
interventions, along the lines suggested above.
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